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Abstract
We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war
where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning
the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the
possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult
to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger
war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent
informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars.
We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party
to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads
to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign
intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed
for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil
wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments
and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential
approval rates.
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1 Introduction
There is a large and growing recent economics literature on the motives and
consequences of civil wars. The empirical research has focused on diverse do-
mestic determinants ranging from per-capita income, economic shocks, polit-
ical institutions and poverty to religion, ethnicity or even diseases. The the-
ory has concentrated on understanding why costly conflicts are not deterred.
The emergence and the effects of information asymmetries, uncertainty and
lack of commitment are therefore intensively studied. Yet, a key feature of
civil war is the involvement of foreign governments taking sides for one of the
parts in conflict. The examples are many, even after the end of the cold war.1
The possibility of foreign influence has typically been overlooked; as a reflec-
tion, foreign involvement is not mentioned in the recent literature reviews on
the economic analysis of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007; Blattman and
Miguel, 2009). In this paper, we investigate how third party interventions (a
potential alliance with a foreign state) can generate intra-state conflict that
could otherwise be deterred and provide evidence that foreign involvement
has indeed generated civil war around the world.
We formalize foreign involvement in a simple way which nevertheless pro-
vides clear-cut predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign
governments on the incidence of civil war. In the model we investigate, there
are two domestic groups, to be interpreted as the incumbent government
and the opposition. The domestic motive for conflict is the allocation of
1Historical examples include U.S support to factions in war in Angola (1972-1980s),
Nicaragua (1980s), Afghanistan (1979-1992), Peru (1980-2000), Congo (1996-1997) or
Liberia (1999–2003), among other examples; France involvement in the Algerian (1991-
2002) or Rwandan Civil Wars; or the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire (1916-1918)
instigated by the U.K. Regan (2000) identifies 89 unilateral foreign intervention into civil
wars between 1944 and 1994; a period where 138 intrastate conflicts took place. In a
recent paper on the economic effects of U.S. interventions, Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and
Satyanath (2010) find that more than 30 % of countries were subject to CIA ”successful”
covert interventions between 1947 and 1989. The interventions were ”successful” in the
sense that they installed a new leader or preserved the power of an existing one.
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resources. In situations with no information or commitment problems, the
government can always propose an allocation that would deter the opposition
from involving in a conflict. The fundamental assumption for the emergence
or continuation of civil war is the existence of a third party which we iden-
tify as a foreign government who can affect the probability of winning the
conflict via, for example, monetary transfers or fighting operations in favor
of the opposition. We assume that the post-conflict value of the society
(the size of the pie / spoils) increases after a successful foreign intervention.
This assumption captures situations where the victory of a foreign sponsored
party is followed by foreign investment, aid, access to international financial
institutions, opening of the economy, international trade or any other mea-
sure seen as enhancing economic growth. Since the alliance with a foreign
government creates the expectation of an economic benefit, the possibility of
such an alliance reduces the ex ante bargaining range for peace and hence
might trigger conflict even in the absence of any commitment or informa-
tion problems. But the effects of foreign intervention are far reaching. We
show that the presence of a potentially intervening foreign party leads to
a new commitment problem. Furthermore, potential foreign interventions
cause uncertainties and information asymmetries reinforcing the possibility
of foreign-influenced civil wars. More importantly, these information asym-
metries are persistent over time and hence might be part of an explanation
for long-lasting civil wars.
The model contains an explicit analysis of the cost and benefits for the
foreign government to be involved in civil wars abroad. The economic benefit
is represented by a share of post-conflict resources, provided the supported
faction wins and opens the economy. This involves, for example, corporation
returns to investment or access to unexploited natural resources or increased
gains from trade.2 The economic cost is basically that of supporting a fight-
2Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (Forthcoming) show how CIA regime change operations
raise profits of U.S. multinational corporations. Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and Satyanath
(2010) show that after successful CIA interventions the US used its influence to create
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ing group, for instance, the costs of sending war assistance, guns or even
soldiers. We also model the political incentives to intervene. The political
costs and benefits for the government of the foreign (intervening) country
have two components. First, there is an ideological cost which captures how
war prone the government is. Second, there are political costs and bene-
fits. Funding civil wars are operations that do not receive full support from
society. In fact, these operations are generally secret and organized by in-
telligence agencies like the CIA in the U.S. They involve diverting resources
from other public goods like education or health. And also, these operations
imply that the intervening country contributes with spread of civilian casu-
alties and suffering. Thus, it is costly for the government to be perceived
as spreading civil wars. However, successful interventions are accompanied
with political benefits: supporting winning factions in conflict expands the
influence of the country in foreign affairs and permits the head of the gov-
ernment to be seen as a global leader, which in turns spurs support among
the population. The present analysis shows that civil wars may exist as a
consequence of changes in the domestic political affairs in the potential inter-
vening country by changing the political incentives to intervene. First, the
existence of a foreign influenced civil war depends on the ideological cost of
the government in office in the intervening nation. If this cost varies across
political parties then the incidence of civil war has to be influenced by what
political party holds the foreign government. Second, as the incentives to
intervene abroad depend on the need for the intervening government to gain
political support then civil war incidence should depend on the level of ap-
proval received by the intervening government. Hence, our model predicts
that ideology and approval of the government of the potential intervening
country matters for the likelihood of civil war.
Importantly, the political situation in the intervening country is an ex-
a larger foreign market for American products. These increased imports of US products
mainly arose through direct government purchases.
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ogenous source of variation for the potential civil war in a country abroad.
Thus, estimating the influence of the political party in office and the gov-
ernment approval in the potentially intervening country provides a strategy
for identification of the effect of foreign influence on civil war. The need
of an identification strategy is due to the fact that foreign interventions are
typically secretive and not directly observable in the data.3
To test our predictions we need to identify an intervening country. As we
concentrate on civil wars during the 20th century, we associate the interven-
ing country to the U.S.. The reasons are various. First, the U.S. has exten-
sively intervened in foreign civil wars.4 Second, the U.S. is characterized by a
two-party system and, importantly, the two parties, Republican and Demo-
cratic, have different views on the role of the U.S. in the international arenas.
These differences are epitomized by diverse Republican approaches to foreign
policy like the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe’s doctrine, and principles
present in the Truman, Eisenhower or Bush doctrines.5 This framework for
foreign policy is rooted in the Republican ideology which differs from the gen-
eral approach of the Democratic Party. As a consequence, the two parties
systematically differ in their propensities to intervene in foreign affairs. For
3For example, CIA operations are typically classified as top secret and declassification
- if it occurs at all - only happens a long time after these operations took place. Moreover,
it is likely that the declassification is incomplete.
4We mention a examples in footnote 1.
5These doctrines basically justify interventions abroad by emphasizing the defense of
American values and the moral mandate of preserving (and installing) freedom around the
world. The doctrine elaborated by Monroe, and amended under Roosevelt’s presidency,
was more oriented to preserve American interests in the western hemisphere (Sexton,
Forthcoming); Truman and Eisenhower’s were typically reflections of the Cold War as
they justified the right to intervene abroad as a measure to halt communism. In Truman’s
words “..it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.” Truman (1947). Eisen-
hower was more precise on the goals of the U.S foreign policy. The United States would
give economic and military aid to Middle Eastern Nation as it was essential to preserve this
region from communism. As he put it U.S. intervention would “include the employment
of the armed forces of the United States to protect and secure the territorial integrity and
political independence of such nations requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression
from any nation controlled by International Communism.” Eisenhower (1957).
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example, all (known) CIA regime change operations (sponsoring of a military
coup) took place under Republican presidency (Kinzer, 2006).6 Also, there
is accurate data on presidential approval for the case of the U.S..
Following recent empirical studies, we exploit panel data to identify a
causal link between the politics in the U.S. and the incidence of civil war
relying on within-country variation. We adopt the empirical strategy devel-
oped in Besley and Persson (2009) and estimate the effect of a Republican
government in office and the level of presidential approval. The results are
striking and support our predictions. The incidence of civil war increases un-
der Republican governments and decreases with U.S. presidential approval.
Overall our results suggest that foreign influence is a sizable driver of conflict
around the world. The Republican and approval effects withstand several ro-
bustness checks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we dis-
cuss the related literature. The model is proposed and studied in section 3.
Section 4 contains the explicit cost and benefit analysis of the foreign govern-
ment to intervene abroad and derives our main predictions for endogenous
foreign interventions. Section 5 reports the empirical exercises conducted to
test the predictions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
We clearly emphasize a novel motive for civil war, namely politically / eco-
nomically motivated foreign interventions. This adds to the empirical liter-
ature that mainly concentrated on domestic determinants like slow income
growth, proportion of natural resources, secondary school attainment (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis, 2005), income inequality
(Sambanis, 2005), poverty (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2008), ethnic po-
6In many of these cases, these regimes changes involved civil conflicts like in Iran (1953),
Guatemala (1954), Nicaragua (1936).
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larization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) or even the effect of diseases
(Cervellati, Sunde, and Valmori, 2010).
As discussed in Blattman and Miguel (2009), most of the empirical civil
war literature uses cross-sectional data and fails to exploit within-country
variation in panel data, which leads to biased estimates by replacing time-
varying explanatory variables by their cross-sectional mean. Consequently,
cross-country variation in these explanatory observable variables are con-
founded with cross-country averages in unobserved parameters. To avoid
this problem, we only exploit within-country variations. This way, we follow
a new series of papers using panel data, mainly concerned by the effect of
different economic shocks on civil conflicts. This literature proposes different
instruments to capture income growth or wage shocks in order to address
potential endogeneity problems. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) use
rainfall variation to show a negative relationship between income and civil
war in Africa.7Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) and Dube and Vargas (2008)
study the effect of changes in commodity prices in Sub-Saharan countries
and Colombia, respectively. Besley and Persson (2009) use both instruments
in a more general study on the determinants of political violence, which
includes civil war and state repression. They also show how the effect of
income shocks depend on political institutions. Our paper builds on this last
paper, albeit our focus on civil war, and includes the dimension of foreign
intervention.
We contribute to the theoretical literature on civil war by identifying
a novel reason why bargaining breaks down in costly fighting, namely the
possibility of a third party intervention. This possibility can lead to war even
under symmetric and certain information due to commitment problems.8 On
7In a recent paper, Ciccone (2010) contends that this result is incorrect and finds that
rainfall increases the incidence and onset of civil war.
8Fearon (1995) proposes three broad explanations for war: informational problems,
bargaining indivisibilities and commitment problems. See for example, Esteban and Ray
(2008) who investigate a contest where there is imperfect information about the opponents’
cost of conflict, Padro´ i Miquel and Chassang (Forthcoming) study conflict under strategic
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the one hand, the unfriendly attitude of the incumbent towards the foreign
country leads to bargaining indivisibilities.9 On the other hand, the foreign
country’s alliance with the opposition implies a shift in the distribution of
power which is lost once the alliance does not take place. This is similar to
Powell (2004, 2006), who identifies rapid shifts in the distribution of power
as lying at the heart of war resulting from commitment problems. We also
show how the possibility of foreign intervention may introduce uncertainties
over resources involved in war or/and post conflict spoils, which contribute
in turn to the incidence of civil war.
Our paper adds to the open controversy on whether the U.S. foreign
policy is based on a bipartisan foreign policy consensus or is partisan (that
is, conditioned on whether the government is Republican or Democrat)10 by
providing support for the latter.
Our paper is also related to the “Diversionary theory of war” literature.
A “diversionary war” is a war instigated by a country’s leader in order to
distract its population from their own domestic strife. This option is espe-
cially attractive to leaders facing a near inevitable removal from office since
exercising the war option might enable them to signal a high military or for-
eign policy ability.11 This incentive to gamble for resurrection is also present
in our model, however, the risk of the gamble is considerably reduced due to
the secretive nature of a foreign intervention. Since the public is unlikely to
observe a failed foreign intervention but can be made aware of (or perceive
the effects of) successful ones, one might expect that domestic problems have
a stronger effect on interventions in civil wars than on open aggressions to-
risk; Dal Bo and Powell (2009) explores the possibility of asymmetric information.
9Powell (2004, 2006) argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as
commitment problems. As we will explain in the model section this is indeed the case
with the bargaining indivisibility present in our model.
10See, for example, Rourke (1984); Wittkopf and McCormick (1998); McCormick and
Wittkopf (1990); Meernik (1993); Souva and Rohde (2007); Gowa (1998).
11For theoretical models on the diversionary theory of war see e.g. Hess and Orphanides
(1995); Smith (1996); Tarar (2006).
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wards other countries. Indeed, we provide very robust empirical evidence of
a positive link between low presidential approval rates in the U.S. and inci-
dences of civil wars around the world while the enormous body of empirical
studies on the diversionary theory of war provides rather mixed evidence.12
A recent economics literature emphasizes the influence of foreign coun-
tries in the dynamics of domestic political institutions. Aidt and Albornoz
(Forthcoming) argue that foreign countries may have an economic interest
in sponsoring coups, stabilizing dictatorships and facilitating constrained de-
mocratization abroad in order to protect their foreign direct investment.13
In Bonfatti (2010) a key trading partner may be interested to keep an in-
cumbent in power because the incumbent can be controlled more easily from
the exterior than the challenger using the threat of trade sanction. Aidt,
Albornoz, and Gassebner (2010) show the influence of IMF and World Bank
programmes on political regime transitions. More generally, our paper is
also related to a literature on foreign influence on domestic policy choices
(Antra`s and Padro´ i Miquel (2008); Aidt and Hwang (2008)). Our paper
clearly contributes to this line of research by focusing on civil war instead.
3 The model
In this section we will develop a very stylized model of civil wars that are
either initiated or prolonged by a foreign country. We will take a complete
information approach and follow a long standing tradition in assuming that
“conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations” (Schelling (1960)).
In our setup an incumbent government has to decide how to divide the spoils -
12For example, Ostrom and Job (1986); Morgan and Bickers (1992); Hess and Or-
phanides (1995); Miller (1995, 1999) find evidence for the diversionary theory while
Meernik and Waterman (1996); Gowa (1998); Mitchell and Moore (2002) find evidence
against it. Many of these papers look also at empirical evidence of acts short of war.
13Easterly, Satyanath, and Berger (2008) estimate that (declassified) US and Soviet
interventions abroad have caused a decline in democracy across the world of about 33
percent.
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the country’s pie - with the opposition. In the absence of foreign intervention
the size of the pie is commonly known to be ΠI . The incumbent makes a
take it or leave it offer yΠI to the opposition. If the opposition accepts,
the game ends and the incumbent and opposition receive (1− y)ΠI and yΠI
respectively. If the opposition does not accept, there will be civil war. This
might be a new war or the continuation of an existing war after a failed peace
agreement. A civil war is costly. Fighting destroys 1 − σ of the initial pie.
If the civil war is purely domestic, the opposition wins with probability pd
and the winner gets all the surviving spoils. Payoffs from fighting for the
incumbent and for the opposition are (1− pd)σΠI and pdσΠI respectively.
The following standard argument shows that domestic civil war will al-
ways be deterred.14 The incumbent is willing to deter if (1 − y)ΠI ≥ (1−
pd)σΠI hence if y ≤ (1− (1− pd)σ). The opposition is willing to accept if it
is offered at least its certainty equivalent payoff from war, namely , pdσΠI .
Hence the opposition accepts any offer such that yΠI ≥ pdσΠI . Since fighting
is costly, pdσ ≤ y < (1− (1− pd)σ) and the opposition can always be bought
off. Offering the opposition exactly its certainty equivalent payoff allows the
government to keep whatever is saved by avoiding the war.
We now introduce a third party, a foreign country with economic interests
in the domestic country. These economic interests can take many different
forms e.g. foreign direct investment, trading opportunities, interest in natural
resources, or interests grounded in geopolitical motives. We assume that
the incumbent government has a somewhat unfriendly attitude towards this
foreign state15 either due to ideological reasons or because it fears that the
influence of a foreign state may shift the distribution of domestic political
and/or economic power.16 The foreign government attempts to strike a deal
14Our purely domestic civil war corresponds to the certainty version of Dal Bo and
Powell (2009).
15Or at least less friendly than the opposition.
16The possibility of an alliance between the domestic and the foreign governments is
discussed in Appendix A.
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with the opposition offering foreign support in the civil war (which might
be initiated or already ongoing) in exchange for certain economic favors like,
for example, opening the economy to foreign investment. These economic
favors are assumed to be growth enhancing, hence the post-conflict value of
society increases to ΠF after a successful foreign intervention. For simplicity
we assume that ΠF ∼ U [σΠI ,Π] such that
E[ΠF ] =
σΠI + Π
2
> ΠI ,
which is common knowledge. Moreover, foreign intervention will increase the
win probability of the opposition to pF ≥ pd. In exchange, the opposition
gives the share 1− λO of the increased pie to the foreign country, where λO
is the share that the opposition keeps to itself in case of victory.
Under these assumptions,
Proposition 1 The domestic government cannot deter the opposition from
a foreign initiated civil war if
λO > λOmin =
2(1− (1− pF )σ)ΠI
pF (σΠI + Π)
(1)
Proof. The domestic government is willing to deter the opposition from
taking part in a foreign initiated civil war if (1− y)ΠI ≥ (1− pF )σΠI , hence
y ≤ (1− (1− pF )σ). However, the opposition will not be deterred if
yΠI < pFλO
σΠI + Π
2
Hence deterrence fails if
(1− (1− pF )σ)ΠI < pFλOσΠI + Π
2
11
This result shows that if the alliance with a foreign government increases
the expected ex-post conflict spoils of a society the foreign third party forces
a situation where peaceful agreements are more difficult to reach and might
trigger conflict even in the absence of the typical motives of conflict between
rational parties. However, as we will show now, the presence of a foreign
third party also involves situations where commitment problems, information
asymmetries and uncertainty naturally emerge, leading to additional reasons
for a civil war.
3.1 Foreign-caused commitment problems
In a more realistic setting the result that the possibility of an alliance with
a foreign government makes peaceful agreements are more difficult to reach
is reinforced by the inability of the domestic government to credibly commit
to a peaceful allocation of resources under these circumstances. To see this,
assume that the foreign government offers a λO such that
pd
pF
2σΠI
σΠI + Π¯
< λO < λOmin
thus the offer can be matched (and even improved) by the domestic govern-
ment.
Will the opposition be willing to accept this deal with the domestic gov-
ernment? This crucially depends on the nature of the potential alliance with
the foreign government. If the foreign government is invariant in its interest
in forming an alliance with the opposition, then the domestic government
will deter conflict as long as λO < λOmin and we are back to proposition
1. However, it is unlikely that the foreign government is invariant in its in-
terest in forming an alliance with the opposition. First, the presence of a
potentially intervening foreign country is exogenous to the domestic econ-
omy. Furthermore, the interests associated with interventions abroad change
over time and are determined by factors that are not related to the country
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in conflict.17 Moreover, the benefits of intervention are contingent to what
the opposition will do once in office and clearly being rejected by the opposi-
tion deteriorates the foreign interest in intervention in that country because
it reduces the possibility of future agreements. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that there are situations in which the possibility of an alliance is
restricted to the moment it takes place and rejecting an alliance with a for-
eign government makes any future alliance with the opposition unlikely. In
this case, if the opposition accepts the appeasement offer from the domestic
government, the opposition constitutes less of a threat to the domestic gov-
ernment since its probability of winning the conflict drops from pF to pd. As
a consequence, the domestic government will renege on any earlier agreement
higher than pdσ. This establishes the following result:
Proposition 2 Due to commitment problems, any offer by the foreign gov-
ernment higher that pdσ will trigger a civil war.
Two different forces are at play here. On the one hand, a successful
foreign intervention increases the pie, which reduces the ex ante bargain-
ing range for peace. On the other hand, the foreign intervention induces a
power shift in the domestic country by increasing the win probability of the
opposition. This allows us to link our occurrence of war to Powell (2004,
2006)’s argument that inefficient conflict is due to a commitment problem,
which results from large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power. Accepting
the government’s appeasement attempt requires foregoing this power shift by
giving up the possible alliance with the foreign country. Hence, the govern-
ment cannot credibly offer the opposition a peaceful allocation of pre-civil
war resources because the government would have incentives to renege on
any early agreement once the alliance did not take place. This is a new type
of commitment problem our analysis uncovers.18
17This will be shown in section 4.
18One might wonder why there is no credibility issue concerning the foreign government.
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Another commitment problem prevents the possibility of the opposition
together with the foreign government from buying off the incumbent govern-
ment. We assumed that the incumbent government has a somehow unfriendly
attitude towards the foreign state. This could be due to ideological reasons
or the attempt to preserve the status of being the main political and eco-
nomic elite. Hence, keeping the foreign state out of the country implies some
indivisible rents.19 Still, indivisibilities alone don’t explain the occurrence of
war because of the destruction it implies. Indeed, the following mechanism
which is based on a mechanism proposed by Powell (2006) would seem to
dominate the war. With probability pF the opposition gets control over the
country and implements the allocation of the pie agreed with the foreign
country while with the opposite probability the incumbent government gets
control over the country and keeps the pie without opening the economy to
the foreign country. However, the loser of the gamble always has an incentive
to renege because the returns from starting a civil war are higher than the
returns from the ex post allocation. The real impediment to agreement is not
the indivisibility itself but the commitment problem that the indivisibility
entails.
3.2 Foreign-caused information asymmetries
Our model has abstracted from information asymmetries, which are a central
theme in the literature on rationalist explanations of war. It is generally
accepted that informational asymmetries can cause civil wars,20 however,
asymmetric information about relative power and the willingness to fight
Notice that the opposition will be in charge after winning the conflict, hence the real issue
is why the opposition is credible. The opposition has an incentive to stick to the deal
because otherwise there will be no investments or aid which are necessary to increase the
pie. The foreign government will stick to the deal to avoid expropriation.
19The unfriendly attitude and bargaining indivisibilities might also be due to an alliance
of the government with another foreign country.
20E.g. Esteban and Ray (2008) show that asymmetric information about the fighting
resources involved may initiate a conflict.
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cannot fully explain long lasting conflicts because both sides will learn each
other’s capability, tactics and resolve over time (Fearon (2004)). In what
follows we will argue that the existence of a potential intervening country
destroys this insight: the possibility of foreign interventions is likely to lead
to asymmetric information which might not only cause but also explain long
lasting civil wars.
It is likely that an alliance with a foreign country causes asymmetric
information about the win probabilities between the domestic parties. More-
over, and more importantly, the exact amount of foreign resources depend
on political factors in the foreign country that are highly uncertain and bet-
ter understood by the alliance since they are not directly observable from
the domestic country.21 These fluctuations are exogenous to the domestic
parties in conflict and might lead to long lasting information asymmetries,
which change over time and cannot (rapidly and evenly) be learned. This
way, foreign interventions generate persistent uncertainty over the fighting
resources available for each party in conflict which might explain even long-
lasting conflicts.
The foreign country might not only create uncertainty and information
asymmetries about the win probabilities in the conflict, it is also likely to cre-
ate uncertainty about the domestic spoils, namely the size of the domestic
pie to be shared by the government and the opposition. This way, poten-
tial foreign interventions generates uncertainty over the environment (payoffs
associated with each strategy) inducing strategic risk, which, as shown by
Padro´ i Miquel and Chassang (Forthcoming) difficulties the deterrence of
conflict.
Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assume that the group that has
reached an agreement with the foreign country has a better idea about the
21This will be shown in Section 4 where we identify two important potential variations.
The head of government in the foreign country might change and hence also the personal
costs of going to war. Approval rates vary over time and change the incentives to intervene
abroad.
15
actual size of the spoils, since it learns about the investment plans, technology
and other factors of the foreign country. In this case, civil war becomes more
likely.22 In short, foreign influence and the possibility of a foreign intervention
aggravates the effects of asymmetric information on civil war incidence.
We now turn to the cost benefit analysis of the foreign intervention to
investigate the condition under which the foreign government is will to cre-
ate/prolong a civil war abroad.
4 Endogenous foreign intervention
The head of government of a foreign country is willing to take part in a
civil war abroad if the total benefits outweigh the costs. Both benefits and
costs have an economic and personal/ideological component. We analyze
the economic component first. The economic costs of the intervention are
given by f(r) where r are the resources dedicated to the intervention. Let
f(0) = 0 and f ′(r) > 0, f
′′
(r) ≤ 0. The amount of resources affects the win
probability pF . We assume that p
′
F (r) > 0 and that pF (r) ≤ 1 for ∀r. Also
pF (r = 0) = pd. The economic benefits of the intervention are simply
pF (1− λO)σΠI + Π
2
,
where λO is the share of the pie given to the opposition. We consider the case
where full commitment of the domestic government is possible.23 Therefore
λO > λOmin, as defined by equation (1). Hence, the maximum benefit the
foreign government can get is by offering the opposition λOmin + ε. For
22Dal Bo and Powell (2009) have shown that if the party in power has better information
about the spoils then the opposition, the opposition will fight with positive probability even
when offered the same amount of spoils than under symmetric information. The opposition
will learn the private information of the government because the positive probability of
fighting disciplines the government to reveal the truth.
23The analysis in the absence of full commitment (available upon request) is similar and
does not change the predictions of the model.
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expositional purposes we will let ε → 0 and analyze everything in terms
of the maximum share of the foreign pie that can be kept by the foreign
government, namely
1− λO = pF (σΠI + Π)− 2(1− (1− pF )σ)ΠI
pF (σΠI + Π)
=
pF (Π− σΠI)− 2ΠI(1− σ)
pF (σΠI + Π)
Therefore the maximum economic benefits from supporting a civil war abroad
are given by
pF (Π− σΠI)− 2ΠI(1− σ)
2
(2)
We now turn to the personal costs and benefits of causing a civil war
abroad. These have two components:
• An ideological component capturing the strictly personal cost ci of pro-
voking a civil war.
• The level of approval enjoyed by the government.
We assume that the head of government cares about his approval because
he derives personal rents from being popular: these rents can be interpreted
as future rents due to re-election possibility or simply as ego-rents. We will
denote the rents resulting from the head of government’s popularity before
deciding whether or not to finance an intervention in another country by u.24
A successful ending of the war will spurt the head of government’s popularity
24Alternatively, we can interpret ci and u as determined by lobbying from corporations.
ci may capture differences in how sensitive political parties are to lobbying or care about
corporation business opportunities. A more pro-corporation party should be associated
with a lower (or even a negative) ci. Indeed, there is evidence that this is the case for
the U.S. where the Republican Party seems to be more influenceable by lobbies than the
Democratic Party (see, for example, Jayachandran (2006)). Similarly, if the probability
of re-election is associated with campaign contributions, then a government with low
approval will increase its re-election probabilities by relying more on the support from
corporations. This in turns makes the government more likely to intervene abroad to
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because of the possibility of signaling (e.g. by a state visit) global leadership
and the new economic benefits associated with friendlier governments around
the world.
To keep the model simple we assume that after a successful civil war the
popularity jumps up to u > u. An unsuccessful foreign intervention will
only affect the head of government’s approval if discovered by the public
resulting in a drop in approval to a minimum level u < u. We assume a fixed
probability δ that the public discovers the covert support for an unsuccessful
civil war. With these assumptions sponsoring a civil war can improve the
head of government’s ego-rents if
pFu+ (1− pF )δu+ (1− pF )(1− δ)u > u
or equivalently
pF (u− u)− δ(1− pF )(u− u) > 0 (3)
Proposition 3 For pF >
δ
1+δ
condition (3) is easier to satisfy the lower is
u.
Proof. The left hand side of (3) is decreasing in u if pF >
δ
1+δ
Hence, if the probability to be discovered is sufficiently small relative to
the probability of success in the civil war, initiating a civil war abroad serves
unpopular politicians as a way to gamble for resurrection at home. The lower
their initial popularity, the less there is to lose in case of a failed intervention
and the more there is to gain in case of a successful intervention.
Joining economic and personal incentives the head of government in the
foreign country will be willing to go to war if and only if
pF (σΠI + Π)− 2ΠI(1− σ)
2
+ pF (u− u)− δ(1− pF )(u− u) > ci + f(r) (4)
improve corporations business opportunities. For example, Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu
(2008) show that CIA operations to depose leaders abroad increase stock market values of
corporations benefiting from the perspective of a new friendlier government in the foreign
country.
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or equivalently collecting all terms multiplying pF as
pF
(
(σΠI + Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
− f(r) > ci + ΠI(1− σ) + δ(u− u)
Any interior r has to satisfy the following first order condition:
p′F
(
(σΠI + Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
= f ′(r) (5)
The politician will choose this interior r if and only if it satisfies (4). Other-
wise he will refrain from the intervention.
For illustrative purposes we use the following particular functional forms
for pF and f(r) in the remainder of the section. Let
pF =
ro + r
rI + ro + r
where rI and ro are the resources devoted to fighting by the incumbent and
the opposition respectively and
f(r) = r
Under these assumptions (5) becomes
rI
(ro + rI + r)2
(
(σΠI + Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
= 1
So the optimal resources r dedicated by the foreign government towards the
civil war are
r =
√
rI
(
(σΠI + Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
− ro − rI
19
and
pF = 1−
√
rI√(
(σΠI+Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
Substituting the resulting expressions for f(r) and pF into equation 4 and
simplifying yield
Ψ =
√((σΠI + Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
−√rI
2+ro−ΠI(1−σ)−δ(u−u) > ci
(6)
After inspection of Ψ, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 The foreign politicians willingness to sponsor a civil war
abroad is increasing in ro and decreasing in δ, rI , ci and u.
Proof. The comparative static results for ro , rI and ci are immediate
from condition (6). Simple calculations show that the left hand side of (6)
decreases in δ. The change with respect to u is given as
∂Ψ
∂u
= (−1 + δ)
√(
(σΠI+Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
)
−√rI√(
(σΠI+Π)
2
+ (u− u) + δ(u− u)
) − δ < 0
This result implies two testable predictions of our model:
Prediction 1 Ideology matters: the probability of civil war should increase
if the head of the foreign government has a more pro-war ideology and hence
lower personal costs ci to initiate a civil war.
Prediction 2 Approval matters: The probability of civil war decreases with
the approval of the foreign government within its own country.
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Prediction 2 might be surprising. Since involvement in civil wars is se-
cretive, how can this depend on presidential approval rates? It is exactly
this secretive nature of foreign interventions that make them a safe bet. An
unsuccessful involvement in a civil war is likely to go unnoticed by the pub-
lic, while the president always has ways and means to get credit for new
economic opportunities after a successful intervention even if the public does
not know whether or not their country was involved. The downside is low
risk and is smaller for governments with low approval than for popular gov-
ernments while the upside is bigger. The secretive nature of the intervention
encourages the gamble.
These predictions are important since they relate politics in the foreign
country to the probability of civil wars around the world. Obviously, this
depends on the actual foreign country we consider. We turn to this in the
implementation of the empirical analysis.
5 Empirical Exercises
As foreign military operations in domestic conflicts abroad are generally
covert, the effect of foreign intervention on civil war incidence is difficult
to observe directly. Yet, our previous analysis provides two different strate-
gies for identification based on the political situation in the foreign country
which changes the incentives to intervene. Empirical support for predictions
1 and 2 also constitutes indirect support for the relevance of foreign influence
in civil wars. An attractive characteristic of this strategy is that party swings
in office and government approval in the intervening country are exogenous
variations in the determinants of civil war from the perspective of the country
potentially in conflict.
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5.1 Implementation Strategy
To test our predictions, we focus on the case of the U.S. as a source of
foreign intervention. As discussed in the introduction, there are numerous
episodes of civil war where one of the sides was supported by the U.S. Also,
the Democrat and Republic government may differ in their foreign policy and
willingness to intervene in foreign affairs. Last, as civil war foreign operations
are mainly secret, U.S. citizens vote without these interventions in mind.
As a proxy for personal costs and benefits from supporting a civil war
abroad we use the president’s party affiliation and his approval rates (PAt).
To illustrate the plausibility of a Republican effect on civil war, we de-
fine a dichotomic variable indicating whether the U.S. incumbent party is
Republican or not. That is,
REPt =
{
1, if U.S. government is Republican in year t
0, Otherwise
Just to give some preliminary evidence of the Republican effect, we have
estimated that the number of civil wars (as defined below) in the world is
more than 50% larger in years where the U.S. is under a Republican govern-
ment. To be more precise, from 1816 to 1996 the mean of civil war conflicts
under Republican office in the U.S. is 5.62, while the same figure for the years
under Democrats is 2.97. The number of civil wars is larger when we focus on
the period 1946-2005 (about 15 per year) and the Republican effect shrinks
but remains suggestively higher (13 under Democrats and 17 under Repub-
licans). Naturally these figures, while consistent with U.S. influenced civil
wars, may reflect other factors playing a role. Therefore, we now investigate
our predictions in more detail.
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5.2 The main estimation
We estimate the incidence of civil war; that is, the probability of observing
civil war in country j in year t (conflict jt).
To put our results in context, we replicate the empirical strategy devel-
oped in Besley and Persson (2009). Consequently, we use a variable of natural
disasters (Natural Disaster j,t) as an instrument for wage or income shocks.
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As discussed above, most of the empirical civil war literature fails to exploit
within-country variation in panel data, which leads to biased estimates. To
avoid this problem, we only exploit within country variations. Thus, country
fixed effects (γj) are used in all of our main estimations as in Besley and Pers-
son (2009),Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) or Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti
(2004). To this specification, we include our REPt and PAt variables.
The main difficulty with our empirical strategy is that both REP and PA
are year (country-invariant) variables, which makes it difficult to distinguish
the effects of Republican governments or presidential approval from any other
country invariant year effect, like, for example, aggregate shocks taking place
at the world level in a given year. In principle, this should not be a serious
source of concern as long as the processes followed by the political cycle or
the evolution of preferential approval in the U.S. are independent from the
process governing the evolution of the other relevant year fixed effects, like
global productivity or demand shocks. In any case, to mitigate this unlikely
but potential problem, we include the growth of gross world (∆logGWPt)
product to capture aggregate demand or productivity shocks. Furthermore,
we also include in some specifications the U.S. gross domestic product to
control for economic shocks specific to the U.S. (∆logGWPUS,t). This way
we control for potential sources of civil war that can be hiding behind our
REPt or PAt variables.
To summarize, we test estimations of the following type:
25Arguably, these constitute exogenous variation in the evolution of the wage/income
rate.
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conflictjt = α1Natural Disasterjt + α2REPt + α3PAt + x
′
tβ + γj + µjt,
where x′ is a vector of additional (country invariant) year variables like the
mentioned ∆logGWPt or ∆logGWPUS,t.
As we follow Besley and Persson (2009) we expect α1 to be significantly
negative. More importantly for our purposes, Predictions 1 and 2 imply a
positive α2 and negative α3.
5.3 Data
Our basic data set is taken from Besley and Persson (2009). This data
is in panel form for 181 countries and years from 1950 to 2005. It uses
the UCDP/PRIO civil-war incidence measure taking a value of 1 if a given
country in a given year was involved in civil war - defined by a cumulated
death toll of more than 1000 people. Alternatively, we use a measure of civil
war based on the Correlates of War (COW) database, which runs up to 1997
but has the advantage of providing information that goes back to 1816.
The measure of natural disasters is constructed by Besley and Persson
(2009) from the EM-DAT data set and includes the number of extreme tem-
perature events, floods, slides and tidal-waves in a given country and year.
The presidential approval rates, our PA variable, are taken from Gallup.
We use the total percentage of positive presidential approval per year.
Last, statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP are taken
from Angus Maddison’s dataset.26
26http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/
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5.4 Results on the Republican Effect
We report the results of our basic specification in Table 1. To allow for
country fixed effects, we estimate conditional logits. In column 1 we report
the most basic specification. Reassuringly, negative shocks in the wage rate
or income triggered by a natural disaster raise the probability of observing
civil war in a similar way and order of magnitude than Besley and Persson
(2009). Importantly, the coefficient associated with REPt is positive and
significant. The magnitude of the estimated effect is far from trivial: the
coefficient implies an odd ratio of 1.56, which indicates that the probability
of observing a civil war in a country is 56 % higher when the U.S. is under
a Republican presidency.
The effects of these two variables are robust to any modification we per-
form on the basic specification. In the remaining specifications we include
∆logGWPt. This way we control for aggregate productivity or demand
shocks, which may be correlated with the U.S. political party in office. The
associated coefficient is negative but insignificant. In the following estima-
tion (columns 3), we add ∆logGWPUS,t, which controls for GDP growth in
the U.S. Interestingly, this variable appears to have a negative effect on civil
war incidence, which suggests that U.S. sponsored civil war might be likelier
during recessions. Including these additional country invariant year variables
has no qualitatively effect on neither the way in which Natural Disaster (as
a proxy of wage rate or income shocks) or REPt affect the probability of a
civil war. In column 4, we include a variable indicating years under cold war.
This way we control for foreign wars motivated by the confrontation between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As expected, the effect of the cold war is to
increase the incidence of civil war.27 Importantly, including this additional
variable adds additional year specific effects. Although lower, the coefficient
of REPt is still positive and significant, which suggests that the Republican
27Notice that this effect is not uncovered by an analysis based on cross-country regres-
sions. See for example, Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis (2005).
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effect goes beyond the cold war.
Table 1: The Republican Effect on Civil War
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.445*** 0.443*** 0.432*** 0.447***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064)
REPt 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.515*** 0.472***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.114) (0.116)
∆logGWPt -0.382 2.640** -0.440
(0.344) (1.312) (0.369)
∆logGDPUS,t -2.337*
(1.363)
Cold War 0.256**
(0.120)
Sample All All All All
Observations 3,046 3,046 3,040 3,046
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.5 Results on Presidential Approval
We investigate now whether the level of approval for the U.S. president has
an impact on the probability of observing a civil war. We build on the
previous results to undertake our second test. As discussed above, we expect
U.S. presidents to be keener to intervene abroad under low level of approval.
Thus, if foreign intervention is a determinant of civil wars we should expect a
significantly negative coefficient associated with our U.S presidential approval
variable (PAt). And that is what we observe in all our specifications. The
coefficient of PAt is always negative and significant. The implied odd ratio
is .96, This indicates that a decrease of PAt in 1 percentage point raises
the probability of civil war by 4%. Observe that the coefficient associated
with REPt is even bigger once PAt is controlled for. This further reinforces
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the idea that the effect of Republican government is rather ideological (i.e.
intrinsic to Republican ethos).
Table 2: Basic Specification with Preferential Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.340*** 0.336*** 0.324*** 0.309***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
REPt 0.769*** 0.780*** 0.795*** 0.898***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.126) (0.134)
PAt -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆logGWPt -0.519 1.835 -0.454
(0.409) (1.642) (0.375)
∆logGDPUS,t -0.856
(1.741)
Cold War -0.338**
(0.142)
Sample All All All All
Observations 2,177 2,177 2,171 2,177
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.6 Robustness
We perform a multiplicity of robustness checks. In table 3 we report a series
of variations on the samples we considered previously. In column 1, we re-
strict the sample to non-OECD countries. If any, the effect is to increase the
coefficients associated with REPt and PAt. As a check, we focus on OECD
countries in column 2. Reassuringly, the key coefficients loose significance. In
columns 3 and 4, we concentrate on South-Saharan countries and Commod-
ity Exporters, respectively. Both of our key results hold. In column 4, we
explore further the possibility that REP is capturing something else rather
than variation in the propensity of the U.S. to intervene abroad. We can
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argue that party ideology of a foreign government should be more important
for the case of the U.S. than for other countries. That is, we should not
observe that the probability of civil war is determined by which party is in
office in countries like, for example, Sweden or even in the U.K. Interestingly,
politics in those countries are also characterized by alternating political par-
ties with different ideology so we can create variables like SOCIALISTSWt or
CONSERVATIVEUKt . These new variables take the value of 1 if the govern-
ment is conservative in the U.K. and socialist in Sweden respectively, and 0
otherwise. Once we include these variables, only the coefficient associated
with REP is significant (and still positive). This reinforces the view that civil
wars are influenced by the U.S., specially under Republican terms. Notice as
well that the inclusion of SOCIALISTSWt or CONSERVATIVE
UK
t does not
affect the effect of PAt.
Table 3: Robustness Checks, different samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.322*** 1.076** 0.864*** 0.147 0.334***
(0.0675) (0.486) (0.261) (0.154) (0.0676)
REPt 0.820*** 0.0348 0.800*** 0.824*** 0.673***
(0.126) (0.617) (0.225) (0.195) (0.131)
SOCIALISTSWt 0.150
(0.141)
CONSERVATIVEUKt 0.215
(0.165)
PAt -0.0273*** -0.000676 -0.0243** -0.0287*** -0.0184***
(0.00553) (0.0254) (0.0101) (0.00816) (0.00535)
∆logGWPt -0.482 -12.93** -1.130 2.716 -0.458
(0.372) (6.396) (2.343) (2.008) (0.374)
Sample Non-OECD OECD South-Saharan Commodity All
countries countries countries Exporters
Observations 2,055 122 501 940 2,153
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We explore different specifications in Table 4. In column 1, we include
a time trend, which turns out to be positive and significant. In column 2,
we report an estimation with decade fixed effects. Column 3 displays the
estimation where we replaced NaturalDisasterj,t by the ∆logGDPj,t as in,
for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004). In column 4, we add a new variable
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that takes the value of 1 for democratic countries defined using the Polity
IV measures of democracy. This way we add more time variant domestic
determinants. This has no effect on the relevance of REP and PA on the
incidence of civil war. In column 5, we explore the possibility of our results
being influenced by the timing between the moment the decision is made and
the actual implementation of the intervention. We do so by lagging PA by
1 year and disaggregating REP in the first, second, third and fourth year
of a Republican term. All the coefficients associated with REPY 1t , REP
Y 2
t ,
REPY 3t , REP
Y 4
t and PAt−1 have the sign and significance we expected.
Finally, in column 5 we report our basic specification but using an alter-
native variable of civil war instead, built on the Correlates of War (COW)
database. Clearly, our results on the effect of the ideology and the support
of a U.S. government are robust to any of these variations.28
Last, we estimate a linear probability model using OLS instead of con-
ditional logit. As shown in table 5, the results are similar and if anything
of a smaller magnitude. For example, the coefficient associated with REP
indicates that the unconditional probability of observing a civil war, which
is around 15 %, raises about 20 % when Republicans are in office.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that civil wars might be triggered by foreign inter-
vention. In our model, the existence of a third party with the capacity of
increasing the probability of victory and the expectations over post-conflict
economic benefits implies a new type of commitment problem that induces
civil war in situations where otherwise a conflict could have been deterred.
These foreign interventions are typically secretively in nature and therefore
difficult to observe directly. We develop a very stylized model to analyze
28In fact, we have run the same regressions reported in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 but on a
measure of civil war incidence based on COW and all the results hold.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks, different specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural Disasterj,t -0.00394 0.119* 0.344*** 0.478***
(0.0732) (0.0708) (0.0671) (0.0727)
REPt 0.462*** 0.855*** .488*** 0.472*** 0.439***
(0.129) (0.135) (0.117) (0.118) (0.121)
REPY 1t 0.519***
(0.176)
REPY 2t 0.731***
(0.182)
REPY 3t 0.811***
(0.177)
REPY 4t 0.729***
(0.178)
PAt -0.0124** -0.0271*** -0.0154*** -0.0142*** -0.0237***
(0.00602) (0.00590) (0.00479) (0.00489) (0.00537)
PAt−1 -0.0181***
(0.00538)
∆logGWPt -0.268 -0.326 -0.652 -0.625 -0.431 -1.549
(0.403) (0.351) (.509) (0.496) (0.366) (1.475)
∆logGDPj,t -0.077*** -0.0733***
(.00985) (0.00987)
Democracyj,t -0.729***
(0.148)
year Trend yes
Decade Fixed Effects yes
Observations 2,177 2,177 2,561 2,519 2,153 1,860
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the incentives for a third party to intervene. From this model, we derive
two clear-cut predictions that allow for identifying the relevance of foreign
intervention on the incidence of civil war. Both predictions are confirmed for
the case of the U.S as a potential intervening country: (i) civil wars are more
likely to take place when the U.S. is under a Republican government and (ii)
the probability of civil wars decrease with U.S. presidential approval rates.
While this paper shows that the U.S. politics influences the possibility
of peace in the rest of the world, it is silent on whether this is actually
good or bad. In fact, a successful intervention in our model could lead to
economic booms in both the intervened and intervening countries. We do
not investigate the welfare effects of these interventions which are left as an
open question for future research.
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Table 5: Basic Specification with Preferential Approval Linear Probability
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural Disasterj,t 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
REPt 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PAt -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
∆logGWPt -0.077*** 0.056 -0.072*** -0.075*** 0.060
(0.024) (0.072) (0.024) (0.026) (0.060)
∆logGDPUS,t -0.018
(0.069)
Cold War -0.014**
(0.006)
Sample All All All All Non-OECD Commodity
countries exporters
Observations 6,750 6,750 6,744 6,744 5,502 4,115
R-squared 0.302 0.303 0.298 0.299 0.299 0.304
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix A: Foreign intervention in favor of
the domestic government
Our model can explain the onset of a civil war but also the continuation
of a civil war in which the presence of a foreign country destroys a possible
peace agreement. In order to ensure the returns to its investment, the foreign
country will only be willing to add to the growth of the domestic country
if the party in power - his ally - is sufficiently strong. In other words, it
is reasonable to assume that the foreign country only increases the home
country’s pie after the faction it supported won the war. This is reflected
in our previous model where the foreign country would choose to support
the opposition. But if the foreign country intervenes in an on-going war
supporting the party in power might also lead to the continuation of war.
To see this, suppose that the present value of the spoils is ΠI as before and
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the domestic government has to decide whether to appease the opposition
by offering a share y of these spoils. Alternatively, it could make an alliance
with the foreign country exchanging certain economic favors against support
in the civil war and total benefits x of the new economic opportunities arising
from the investment of the foreign country. Let (1−px) ≥ (1−pd) be the win
probability of the incumbent government resulting from a successful alliance
with a foreign country. Then
Proposition 5 The incumbent government will prefer the alliance with the
foreign country to appeasing the opposition if (1−σ)
1−px ΠI < x
Proof. The incumbent government is willing to appease the opposition if
(1− y)ΠI ≥ (1− px)(σΠI + x)
or equivalently if
y ≤ 1− σ + pxσ − (1− px) x
ΠI
On the other hand the opposition is willing to accept if
yΠI > pxσΠI
The bargaining range is empty if
1− σ − (1− px) x
ΠI
< 0
The intuition is as follows. The government continues the war if what
is destroyed by the war, namely (1− σ) ΠI , is less than the expected new
economic opportunities for the government created by the war , namely (1−
px)x. The cost benefit analysis of the foreign government of the previous
section applies with the economic benefits being (1− px)(E(ΠF )− x)− f(r)
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and the personal costs being unmodified. Clearly, our empirical predictions
1 and 2 also follow in this case.
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